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RETHINKING THE ORDER OF BATTLE IN 




The Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan1 ended an eight-
year experiment in the adjudication of qualified immunity claims.2  That 
experiment began with Saucier v. Katz, in which the Court held that lower 
courts must decide whether a government officer violated a plaintiff’s con-
stitutional rights before addressing the question of whether the government 
officer was entitled to immunity.3  The Court’s rationale for requiring lower 
courts to first address the merits was the need to clarify constitutional law 
for the benefit of both government actors (who could then better conform 
their behavior to constitutional standards) and future plaintiffs (who could 
then overcome the defense of qualified immunity and recover damages for 
their injuries).4  But Pearson overturned Saucier’s mandate, holding that 
merits-first adjudication, while often appropriate, “should no longer be re-
garded as mandatory.”5  The Court cited a number of reasons for its deci-
sion, including the detriment to judicial efficiency; the reality that principles 
articulated may be of little value, particularly if a higher court is about to 
pass on the same question or if the question involves state law; the difficul-
ty of making law on uncertain facts when qualified immunity is asserted at 
the pleading stage; the concern that the government will be unable to appeal 
an unfavorable decision on the merits if it prevails on qualified immunity; 
 
†  This Essay was originally published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on No-
vember 22, 2010, as Nancy Leong, Rethinking the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts: A Reply to 
John Jeffries, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 135 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2010/26/LRColl2010n26Leong.pdf. 
  Assistant Professor, University of Denver School of Law.  I am grateful for helpful comments and 
suggestions I received from Alan Chen, Scott Dodson, Charlotte Garden, John Jeffries, Pam Karlan, Al-
lison Orr Larsen, Justin Marceau, and Justin Pidot.  Bill Novick provided valuable research assistance. 
1  129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
2  See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that, if it were his choice, he would “end the failed Saucier experiment now”). 
3  533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808. 
4  Id. at 200–01. 
5  Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 
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and the contravention of the longstanding principle of constitutional avoid-
ance.6 
I have previously argued that Saucier’s merits-first approach was mis-
guided.7  I based my conclusion both on various analytic criticisms of man-
datory merits-first adjudication8 and on an original empirical study 
indicating that the merits-first approach led disproportionately to the articu-
lation of law-narrowing constitutional rights.9  In explaining the latter, I hy-
pothesized that the close relationship between the merits and qualified 
immunity inquiries engenders cognitive disincentives for judges to recog-
nize a constitutional violation yet grant qualified immunity.10  Unsurprising-
ly, I agree with the result in Pearson; my chief complaint is that the Court 
provided insufficient guidance to lower courts as to when they should de-
cide the constitutional question.11 
In a recent article, John Jeffries critiqued Pearson while engaging re-
cent scholarship on qualified immunity, including my own.12  He expressed 
skepticism that the qualified immunity inquiry engenders cognitive disin-
centives to reach certain results.13  He also contended that Pearson failed to 
adequately analyze the competing interests embedded in the question of me-
rits adjudication.14  Merits avoidance entails significant costs, which, in 
many instances, outweigh those of merits adjudication.  First, if merits ad-
judication is not mandatory, judges may fail to resolve important constitu-
tional questions.15  And second, in areas of the law where constitutional tort 
actions are the primary vehicle for articulating constitutional principles, me-
rits avoidance may effectively narrow the scope of rights by rendering reso-
lution perpetually indefinite.16  As he has argued elsewhere with respect to 
remedies,17 Jeffries advocated “disaggregating” the approach to lawmaking 
in § 1983 and Bivens actions by evaluating whether constitutional tort ac-
tions are the primary means of remedying violations in a particular doctrinal 
 
6  See id. at 819–21. 
7  See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. 
L. REV. 667, 676–84 (2009). 
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 684–702. 
10  Id. at 700–08. 
11  Id. at 709. 
12  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 115. 
13  Id. at 124–26.  Jeffries is generally skeptical of the criticisms of mandatory merits adjudication, 
but he thinks they are valid in some instances, particularly with the problem of appealability.  Id. at 131. 
14  Id. at 131. 
15  See id. at 120. 
16  See id. at 131. 
17  John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 290–92 (2000). 
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area.18  If they are, he believes, then merits adjudication in qualified immun-
ity actions is both desirable and essential.19 
Jeffries’ article presents many valuable insights.  I concur both with his 
characterization, also developed elsewhere, of qualified immunity as one 
way of removing disincentives for innovation20 and with his ongoing advo-
cacy of an approach to constitutional torts that takes account of available al-
ternative remedies.21  I write this brief reply in the hope that clarifying the 
points on which we do disagree will advance the broader discussion. 
We part company on two grounds.  First, Jeffries’ view is that clarifi-
cation of constitutional law is inherently desirable.22  While I do not, of 
course, advocate confusion in constitutional interpretation, I remain uncon-
vinced that any law is always better than no law.  That is, if law articulated 
in certain circumstances is ill considered or prematurely issued, I do not 
view the existence of that law as a benefit in itself.  I am particularly con-
cerned with situations in which factors extrinsic to the substantive merits in-
fluence courts’ articulation of legal principles.  As my previous research 
suggests, factors particular to the context of qualified immunity adjudica-
tion raise concerns that the law articulated in that context will tend to nar-
row constitutional rights.23 
This concern leads to another of greater generality.  Jeffries’ priority is 
for the law to be clarified.24  In advancing this proposition, he assumes that 
one forum for law articulation is as good as another—for example, a sup-
pression hearing in a criminal prosecution is functionally identical to a 
damages action under § 1983.  Yet critical differences among the various 
contexts where constitutional lawmaking occurs translate to substantive dif-
ferences in the resulting law.  Our decisions about where law is articulated 
are decisions with substantive consequences.  I argue, therefore, that we 
should consider the characteristics of a particular context when we are de-
ciding whether we want constitutional rights to be clarified in that area. 
 
18  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 136–37. 
19  See id. 
20  Id. at 122; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 
99–100 (1999). 
21  Jeffries, supra note 17, at 262–63; Jeffries, supra note 12, at 136–37. 
22  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 121–26. 
23  See Leong, supra note 7, at 684–94.  I emphasize that the narrowing of constitutional rights is 
not, in itself, my concern here.  Rather, my concern is that the development of constitutional law is being 
skewed—in this case, toward a restrictive conception of rights—by influences endemic to the qualified 
immunity adjudicative context. 
24  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 131. 
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I.  
Is it good for courts to articulate constitutional law?  Some would ar-
gue that clarity in the law is always better.  As the Supreme Court noted in 
Saucier, law articulation benefits defendants in constitutional tort suits, who 
then know how to conform their conduct to the law, as well as plaintiffs, 
who then can recover for violations of their constitutional rights.25  Yet, as 
scholars have also asserted, uncertainty and complexity in the law are some-
times preferable.26 
For my part, I have previously argued that courts’ clarification of con-
stitutional questions in the context of qualified immunity is not always de-
sirable because their decisions disproportionally result in the narrowing of 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.27  In my previous research, I first conducted 
an empirical study in which I read and coded a large random sample of cas-
es involving qualified immunity.28  I found—unsurprisingly—that after 
Saucier, the percentage of cases in which courts articulated constitutional 
law increased.29  I also found—much more surprisingly—that the increase 
resulted from an increase in the percentage of rulings favoring defendants, 
while the percentage of rulings favoring plaintiffs remained relatively con-
stant.30  Other scholars have undertaken empirical studies of the effect of 
Saucier and have reached different conclusions,31 although significant me-
thodological differences render direct comparison with my work inappro-
priate.32 
 
25  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 
(2009). 
26  See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1214 (2010) (describing the moral and democratic benefits that flow from vague legal standards); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1754–57 
(1995) (defending judgments that do not fully articulate their reasoning and therefore leave the outcomes 
of future cases less predefined). 
27  See Leong, supra note 7, at 693. 
28  See id. at 684–88. 
29  See id. at 688–93. 
30  See id. 
31  See Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation 
of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 422–23 (2009) (indicating that plaintiff-friendly arti-
culation of constitutional rights through constitutional tort suits increased significantly from the pre-
Saucier time period to the post-Saucier time period); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 544–48 (2010) (finding that the percentage of cases in which courts acknowl-
edged a constitutional violation, yet granted qualified immunity, increased significantly from the pre- to 
post-Saucier periods). 
32  I will discuss these differences in detail in future work.  Briefly, however, the Hughes and So-
bolski–Steinberg studies examined only published cases.  Mine, in contrast, examined both published 
and unpublished cases on the grounds that judges may be intellectually influenced by evidence of their 
colleagues’ thoughts in previous unpublished opinions and that such opinions therefore carry informal 
precedential weight.  This seems particularly likely if a judge is wondering whether her opinion will be 
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I focus here on the second part of my previous research and Jeffries’ 
discussion of it.  As one possible explanation for courts’ lopsided articula-
tion of constitutional law, I suggested that judges experience cognitive dis-
sonance when they acknowledge that a plaintiff suffered a violation of his 
constitutional rights yet grant qualified immunity so that the injured plain-
tiff cannot recover.  Consequently, I theorized, judges have an incentive to 
avoid such dissonance by harmonizing the ruling on the constitutional me-
rits with the ultimate denial of recovery.33 
As Jeffries accurately observes, my suggestion is speculative.  No re-
search has yet “purport[ed] to link cognitive dissonance with merits-first 
adjudication in constitutional tort cases,”34 and I do not claim to have estab-
lished, with scientific exactitude, a link between judges’ experience of cog-
nitive dissonance and their surprising reluctance to articulate constitutional 
principles favorable to plaintiffs.  Rather, my project proposes a well-
established theory of cognitive psychology—cognitive dissonance35—as 
one plausible explanation for the asymmetry that my empirical research re-
vealed.  Cognitive dissonance, according to my account, need not be the on-
ly explanation, or even the most significant explanation, for judges’ rulings.  
My claim is simply this: Given that judges are human, we should look to 
the study of human cognition as a source of possible explanations for judi-
cial decisionmaking. 
Although Jeffries questions the influence of cognitive dissonance on 
judicial decisionmaking, the idea that cognitive factors affect judging is by 
no means novel.  Indeed, Jeffries and other commentators have elsewhere 
acknowledged that heuristics may play a role in judicial decisionmaking.36 
                                                                                                                           
reversed on appeal, disputed by the other two members of an appellate panel, or considered for rehearing 
en banc.  Likewise, our studies dealt differently with cases involving multiple claims or multiple defen-
dants.  Hughes, for instance, limited his coding to a maximum of two claims per case, while I imposed 
no such limitation.  In cases resolving many claims—and therefore resulting in many instances of law-
making—limiting the number of coded claims understates the precedential impact of the case.  Finally, 
each of the three studies involved somewhat different time periods, which may have resulted in the vari-
ation in the results obtained.  For descriptions of these studies’ methodologies, see Hughes, supra note 
31, at 418–20; Leong, supra note 7, at 684–88; and Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 31, at 539–43. 
33  Leong, supra note 7, at 702–08. 
34  Jeffries, supra note 12, at 125. 
35  Cognitive dissonance is the feeling of discomfort that results from holding two contradictory or 
inconsistent ideas simultaneously, which produces a drive to reduce the dissonance by modifying or re-
jecting one of the inconsistent ideas.  See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
128–29 (1957).  The existence of cognitive dissonance is uncontroversial within the psychology com-
munity and is supported by volumes of research spanning more than fifty years.  See, e.g., JOEL COOPER, 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY (2007); FESTINGER, supra; COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Jud-
son Mills eds., 1999). 
36  For example, in discussing judicial decisions of search and seizure issues on motions to suppress 
evidence, Jeffries explains that, “[f]aced with a succession of guilty defendants objecting to successful 
searches, judges might well give officers the benefit of the doubt.”  Jeffries, supra note 17, at 270.  This 
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Jeffries questions my account on the ground that factors endemic to 
judging render cognitive dissonance inapplicable.37  He argues that research 
has demonstrated that people experience cognitive dissonance only when 
they make decisions freely, and judging—in Jeffries’ view—is not such a 
context.38  He argues that judges do not decide freely—that they are “con-
strained by the external authority of the law”—thereby dispelling any cog-
nitive dissonance.39  Under this view, our judicial system itself provides an 
antidote to any dissonance caused by recognizing a right but denying a re-
medy for the violation of that right. 
More broadly, Jeffries asserts that the application of cognitive disson-
ance theory to judging “swims upstream against the broad current of legal 
reasoning.”40  Judges, he observes, routinely decide issues or claims that are 
related but distinct in a wide range of situations.41  Indeed, legal training in-
stills this ability.  He argues, therefore, that to claim that judges are ill 
equipped to mentally segregate separate issues or claims is to question their 
ability to perform their jobs in general, not merely in the context of quali-
fied immunity.42 
At a basic institutional level, Jeffries’ account of the constraints placed 
on judicial decisionmaking is not entirely convincing.  Most obviously, 
judges are appointed to life terms, and against the background of this life 
tenure, their decisions are seldom reversed.43  Although I do not think that 
our judiciary is populated with rogue jurists who decide each case however 
they please, in practical terms, relatively little prevents such behavior.  In-
deed, Jeffries’ argument that judges feel constrained by Saucier is particu-
                                                                                                                           
reasoning is essentially a version of the availability heuristic.  See Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals 
Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 403–04 (examining the influence of re-
presentativeness and availability heuristics on the outcome of suppression hearings). 
37  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 125. 
38  See id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 126. 
41  See id. 
42  See id. 
43  Appellate judges in particular are surely well aware that the Supreme Court is highly unlikely to 
grant certiorari and, moreover, are often able to predict which cases are plausible candidates.  See Timo-
thy S. Bishop, Jeffrey W. Sarles & Stephen J. Kane, Tips on Petitioning for and Opposing Certiorari in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, LITIGATION, Winter 2008, at 26, 26–27; David C. Thompson & Melanie F. 
Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Re-
sponse and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 241 (2009) 
(explaining that of the 8517 petitions filed in the Supreme Court 2005 October Term, only 78 resulted in 
a grant of certiorari); see also Summary of the Court’s Workload, October Term 2009, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 11, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Preliminary-Stats-OT09_
061110-1.pdf (revealing that during the 2009 Term the Supreme Court granted only eighty petitions for 
certiorari).  Of course, one might argue that judges are seldom reversed precisely because they respect 
the constraints imposed by precedent.  While this may be true, it does not affect the reality that judges 
face few practical constraints on their decisionmaking. 
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larly unpersuasive given that lower court judges both criticized44 and even 
disregarded45 Saucier prior to Pearson and that the Supreme Court itself de-
cided Saucier on the basis of immunity rather than on the merits.46 
More importantly, however, Jeffries bypasses the heart of my argument 
by focusing on discrediting the idea that judges operate without meaningful 
constraints on their decisionmaking.  My claim is not that judges operate 
without constraint.  Rather, my claim is that institutional and precedential 
factors do not completely dictate judicial decisionmaking.  Case outcomes 
are very seldom foregone conclusions: if the law were crystalline, rational 
parties would settle or drop their claims.47  Certainly, precedent plays a role 
in judges’ resolution of the outcome of particular cases.  But precedent is 
seldom entirely dispositive, and where precedent leaves off, other factors—
including cognitive dissonance—may begin to influence judicial decision-
making.  Of course, judges may not universally experience cognitive dis-
sonance.  The point is simply that some judges are likely influenced by 
cognitive dissonance some of the time and that this influence may help to 
explain the empirical trends in the articulation of the law. 
Indeed, judges are less likely to feel constrained by precedent in the 
cases with which Jeffries is most preoccupied.  The qualified immunity de-
fense, for example, generally requires a government officer to demonstrate 
that the law was not clearly established or, effectively, to show that little 
precedent exists.48  And Jeffries’ concern lies primarily with cases invoking 
those areas of doctrine where law clarification is most needed—cases in 
which, by definition, the least precedent (and therefore the least constraint 
on judicial decisionmaking) exists.  In such cases, judges are less likely—
and, indeed, less able—to simply defer to existing precedent. 
The role of cognitive factors in qualified immunity adjudications is en-
hanced by crucial differences between qualified immunity and other doc-
trines—differences that Jeffries’ critique fails to take into account.  He 
argues that “separate questions that must be answered separately,” such as 
 
44  See, e.g., Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dep’t, 315 F.3d 65, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
Saucier’s order of inquiry is “an uncomfortable exercise where . . . the answer [to the constitutional 
question] may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed” and that “[i]t may be that 
Saucier was not strictly intended to cover [such a] case”). 
45  See, e.g., Hatfield-Bermudez v. Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. 
Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006); Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2003); 
Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Roberts v. Ward, 468 F.3d 963, 
970 (6th Cir. 2006) (failing to segregate the constitutional rights and clearly established questions in 
holding that “[b]ecause the plaintiffs’ allegations do not implicate any clearly established constitutional 
rights, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Commissioner Ward”). 
46  See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 251 (2006). 
47  See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 909–10 (2006).  Of 
course, parties are not always rational, but assuming that they generally are, a case that proceeds far 
enough to require a judicial ruling is more likely to hinge on unsettled law. 
48  See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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those arising in the Saucier inquiry, are doctrinally common, and he offers 
as support a nonexhaustive list of such situations: subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction, statutes of limitations, voluntariness of confessions, 
searches and seizures, and expert qualifications.49  The frequency with 
which separate questions are bundled together within the same case, he in-
fers, presupposes that judges are able to distinguish among separate ques-
tions that are part of the same matter.50  Yet the mere fact that judges often 
decide multiple questions together does not alone rule out the possibility 
that such decisionmaking fosters dissonance.  Indeed, we might reasonably 
ask whether dissonance pervades other contexts as well although I do not 
take a position on that possibility here.  More importantly, qualified immun-
ity is significantly more likely to foster dissonance than other contexts in 
which separate questions are decided together.  In qualified immunity adju-
dications, the question of whether a constitutional violation took place over-
laps considerably with the question of whether the officer who committed 
the alleged violation is entitled to qualified immunity.  Both questions in-
volve a close consideration of the conduct at issue juxtaposed with the ap-
plicable substantive law.  The same cannot be said of Jeffries’ other 
examples—the analysis of whether a statute of limitations has run on a 
claim, for example, is wholly separate from the substantive merits of the 
claim.  Thus, the significant overlap between the constitutional and quali-
fied immunity questions renders the qualified immunity context uniquely 
likely to generate dissonance if the results reached on the two inquiries con-
tradict one another. 
Even supposing that one rejects cognitive dissonance as an influence 
on judicial decisionmaking, common sense suggests that an immunity result 
may influence a merits decision.  From a practical perspective, an opinion 
acknowledging a constitutional violation while granting qualified immunity 
is difficult to write.51  In the excessive force context, for example, such an 
opinion would involve a statement that a police officer’s use of force was 
unreasonable enough to be unconstitutional, but not unreasonable enough to 
allow the plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity.52  Distinguishing be-
tween these marginally different points on the continuum of reasonableness 
is a formidable task, one that is difficult to render with intellectual hones-
ty.53  The difficulty of the task may well encourage judges to decide the 
claims in harmony. 
 
49  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 126. 
50  See id. 
51  See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 134–35 (2009) (describing the 
difficulty encountered by courts in disaggregating constitutional and qualified immunity questions). 
52  See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1987) (explaining that the constitutional 
and qualified immunity questions are distinct in the excessive force context). 
53  See, e.g., Hassel, supra note 51, at 125 (“When these two standards are both operating, a court 
must first determine whether a defendant’s actions are objectively reasonable.  Then, assuming that the 
actions were not objectively reasonable, the court must determine whether it was nonetheless objectively 
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Outside of the qualified immunity context, Jeffries and other commen-
tators tend to accept that judges may be influenced by considerations aside 
from the constitutional merits in deciding cases, and they acknowledge that 
pragmatic concerns do sometimes shape substantive outcomes.54  Given that 
the influence of factors extraneous to the merits is relatively uncontrover-
sial, it does not seem implausible that the qualified immunity determination 
may also exert a gravitational pull on the merits decision.55 
None of this is to say that courts should not articulate law in qualified 
immunity proceedings.  Jeffries’ concern for “the underenforcement of con-
stitutional rights while . . . uncertainty continues”56 is one that I share.  Yet 
the concerns I have explored both here and in past research indicate that 
such articulation is not necessarily an unqualified benefit.  Asking courts to 
decide difficult constitutional questions in qualified immunity proceedings 
is strong medicine, and it may have side effects.  We should consider these 
side effects and weigh them against the benefits of law articulation as we 
consider whether, in a particular circumstance, it is good for courts to arti-
culate constitutional law. 
II.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson highlights the need for care-
ful thought about law articulation.  During the past few decades, the Court’s 
jurisprudence has increasingly emphasized that the judiciary not only re-
solves disputes but also makes law.57  This trend is apparent in the Court’s 
increasing willingness to require or permit articulation of constitutional 
principles even where such articulation is not strictly necessary to the out-
come of a particular case.  Qualified immunity is an example of one context 
in which the Court permits such articulation.  Another context is harmless 
error, where the Court has held that courts must decide whether an error oc-
                                                                                                                           
reasonable for the defendant to have believed his actions were objectively reasonable.  The application 
of this nonsensical series of questions leads to skewed results.”). 
54  Jeffries and others agree that heuristics may affect the outcome of exclusionary proceedings.  See 
supra note 36.  Likewise, Jeffries and other commentators agree that absent nonretroactivity—the doc-
trine holding that constitutional decisions affect only plaintiffs injured in the future—courts might well 
avoid innovation because of the costs it would impose upon governments and institutions.  See, e.g., Jef-
fries, supra note 17, at 270–71. 
55  One might reasonably ask why the merits decision would not exert a countervailing gravitational 
pull on the immunity decision.  My data did not reveal any trend in that direction.  One possible expla-
nation is that courts tend to consider the immediate consequences of the case first—whether an officer 
will face exposure to damages liability—and only then turn to the merits. 
56  Jeffries, supra note 12, at 131. 
57  See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal? The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal 
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 968 (2000); Thomas Healy, The 
Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 858–71 (2005). 
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curred at all before they determine whether that error was harmless58—the 
initial decision of whether error occurred leads to the articulation of consti-
tutional principles en route to the decision of whether that error was harm-
less.  A third is the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, where the 
Court has held that courts may decide whether a particular law enforcement 
action was in fact unconstitutional, not merely whether the officer believed 
it to be so.59  In each instance, the Court has settled on an analysis that 
enables the articulation of constitutional principles. 
This emphasis on lawmaking invites us to think normatively about 
where courts should make constitutional law.  Jeffries argues, and I agree, 
that when we consider the process of constitutional law articulation, we 
should not think in isolation about suits for money damages.60  Instead, we 
should consider money-damages suits in conjunction with available alterna-
tive avenues for courts to clarify constitutional rights, such as actions for in-
junctive or declaratory relief, or criminal prosecutions.  As Jeffries 
observes, Pearson’s discussion of such alternative avenues is sorely lack-
ing.61 
We part company, however, with respect to how we should take these 
alternative avenues for lawmaking into account.  For Jeffries, the existence 
of an alternative avenue is the critical issue.  In the past, he has similarly 
advocated a “disaggregated” approach to remedying constitutional viola-
tions.62  Each substantive right, or doctrinal area within that right, should 
have its own doctrine of remedy.  Under this approach, different remedial 
contexts are seen as equally good.  So, for example, when it comes to pro-
viding a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, “money damages and 
exclusion of evidence are substitutes,”63 and the availability of money dam-
ages under constitutional tort actions is important if no other remedies are 
available.64 
The approach Jeffries advocates for the clarification of constitutional 
law parallels his approach to remedying constitutional violations.  We 
should facilitate lawmaking in a particular context if no alternative avenues 
are available for law articulation.65  Under this view, it does not matter 
whether Fourth Amendment law—say, law governing the legality of a par-
ticular type of search—is made in a qualified immunity adjudication or in a 
 
58  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 (1993) (“Harmless-error analysis is triggered only af-
ter the reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed.”). 
59  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924–25 (1984). 
60  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 131–36; Leong, supra note 7, at 709 (describing the relevance of 
the posture of the case and other potential contexts in which the constitutional issue could be litigated). 
61  Jeffries, supra note 12, at 131–32. 
62  Jeffries, supra note 17, at 280–82. 
63  Id. at 283. 
64  See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 117. 
65  See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 280–82; Jeffries, supra note 12, at 137. 
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ruling on the exclusion of evidence.  That lawmaking occurs somewhere is 
sufficient. 
I question this assumption that different contexts are equivalent for law 
articulation purposes.  Scholars have persuasively documented the “intimate 
relationship” between rights and remedies—the influence that the available 
remedy exerts over the development of a particular right.66  In many in-
stances, the law that courts make is inextricable from the remedial context 
in which that law is made. 
In coming work, I discuss in detail the influence of context on lawmak-
ing.67  For present purposes, however, I simply wish to put forward the idea 
that the characteristics of various contexts, including qualified immunity 
proceedings and suppression hearings, influence not only the outcome of 
individual proceedings, but also the law that results from each individual 
proceeding.  My previous work presents data suggesting one such contex-
tual influence: that of a qualified immunity outcome on a merits determina-
tion.68  In other remedial contexts, other influences will emerge. 
Consider the context of a suppression hearing, in which the proponent 
of the constitutional right is a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude evi-
dence from trial.  The court’s attention is drawn to the activities of the po-
lice officers that led directly to finding the evidence.  This focus may 
exclude consideration of other police conduct that, if assessed in isolation, 
might appear problematic to a court. 
One example arises in the law regulating “stops and frisks”—limited 
and often spontaneous police questioning and searching of citizens require 
only reasonable suspicion.  In Terry v. Ohio, Officer McFadden suspected 
three men of planning a robbery and feared that they might be armed.69  He 
approached the men, identified himself, and asked their names.70  “When 
the men ‘mumbled something’ in response to his inquiries, [he] grabbed pe-
titioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two 
[men] . . . and patted down the outside of his clothing,” finding a pistol in 
the pocket of Terry’s overcoat.71 
The Court’s description of the initial physical contact between Officer 
McFadden and Terry is vivid: the officer grabbed the suspect and spun him 
 
66  Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
913–14, 958 (1999); see also, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration 
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1015 (2010) (noting that courts en-
counter an interpretative gap analyzing constitutional criminal rights in a civil remedial context). 
67  Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 91 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1719774. 
68  See Leong, supra note 7. 
69  392 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1968). 
70  Id. at 6–7. 
71  Id. at 7. 
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around, admittedly without probable cause to believe criminal activity had 
occurred.  Yet this use of force is wholly absent from the subsequent legal 
analysis, which focused solely on whether there was justification for the of-
ficer’s “limited search of the outer clothing . . . to discover weapons.”72  As 
Bill Stuntz aptly notes, “stigma and police use of force, which are obviously 
at the heart of the Terry facts, play a surprisingly small role in Terry doc-
trine.”73 
The explanation for the Court’s omission is straightforward: Terry 
raised his claim in a suppression hearing, seeking exclusion of the pistol.74  
The Court therefore focused on what Officer McFadden did to find the pis-
tol—that is, his search of Terry’s pockets—rather than on the nontrivial use 
of force that preceded it.  If the Court had instead considered a § 1983 claim 
alleging that a police officer grabbed a suspect and spun him around, it 
would surely have analyzed the legality of those specific actions even if it 
ultimately found them constitutional.  But because Terry’s facts arose in the 
context of a suppression hearing, the doctrine that emerged from the case 
disregards the use of force in determining the legality of a particular stop 
and frisk. 
The purpose of this brief digression into criminal process is to advance 
a much more general proposition.  If the context of a dispute affects the 
substance of the law that emerges from that dispute, we should regard deci-
sions about where constitutional law is articulated as substantive decisions.  
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Saucier and Pearson, 
dozens of scholarly works have addressed the question of whether law 
should be made, but scarcely any have considered how making law in one 
type of proceeding or another may affect what that law looks like.  Policy-
makers, academics, and other stakeholders think quite carefully and inten-
tionally about the process by which legislators or other government officials 
craft the rules that govern behavior.  These stakeholders tend not to afford 
the same consideration to judicial lawmaking.  But there is no reason this 
should be so.  Surely the lawmaking that courts do is worthy of the same 
evaluation as the lawmaking of legislatures.  After all, poorly considered 
law is more difficult to change than to prevent.  Like all judge-made law, it 
takes root and grows, eventually pollinating the larger constitutional eco-
system. 
So where does this leave us with respect to merits-first adjudication of 
qualified immunity claims?  If, as I have argued, there exists at least a pos-
sibility that qualified immunity will skew decisions made in the context of 
 
72  Id. at 30. 
73  William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1016, 1066 (1995). 
74  Terry, 392 U.S. at 8. 
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money damages, perhaps we should consider alternative avenues through 
which we might encourage the articulation of constitutional law.75 
Criminal prosecution provides one possible forum, at least for claims 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Such claims may be asserted defensively in 
suppression hearings.  Many scholars, however, have expressed concerns 
that the criminal context is fraught with the same problems as the qualified 
immunity context—that is, each situation creates incentives for the courts to 
define constitutional principles in a manner restrictive of individual liberty.  
A judge may find it difficult to disregard the evidentiary loss in close cas-
es—for example, if a particular search yields a large amount of contraband 
and the search’s legality is at least debatable, the evidentiary loss that would 
result from suppressing the evidence might well tip the scales in favor of 
finding no Fourth Amendment violation.76 
Suits for injunctive and declaratory relief present another possibility.  
Skewed judicial lawmaking seems somewhat less likely in such actions be-
cause any remedy is purely prospective and will not involve backward-
looking negative consequences, such as the exclusion of evidence that 
would help convict a hardened criminal or the imposition of damages liabil-
ity on officers who may not have known they were breaking the law.  
Moreover, crafting a forward-looking principle invites judges to consider 
not only the parties before them, but also the entire class of citizens the de-
cision will affect.  This may reduce the possibility that a judge is influenced 
by factors immaterial to the merits, such as the possibly unsavory characte-
ristics of the particular proponent of constitutional rights or the availability 
of qualified immunity.  But the availability of injunctive and declaratory 
remedies is severely limited under current standing doctrine.77  Although the 
wisdom of expanding the availability of injunctive and declaratory relief 
hinges on multiple considerations, we might consider the opportunity for 
well-considered lawmaking as one part of the calculus. 
 
75  Indeed, the Court in Pearson suggested that these alternative avenues should affect a court’s deci-
sion whether to analyze qualified immunity in the Saucier sequence or look solely to the “clearly estab-
lished” question.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821–22 (2009). 
76  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 
(1994) (“Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth 
Amendment was not really violated.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform 
Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1407 (2007) (“Difficulties arise in borderline cases, where the mere 
fact that the constable blundered seems an inadequate reason to set the criminal free.  One suspects that 
many courts in many places strain to avoid that result.” (footnote omitted)); Slobogin, supra note 36, at 
403 (“[R]emoving the threat of exclusion should make judges who hear Fourth Amendment claims more 
willing to discredit factual assertions made by the police.”); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, 
Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 148–49 
(1993) (arguing that the exclusionary remedy “encourages judges to warp Fourth Amendment doctrine 
and to engage in creative fact-finding”). 
77  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983). 
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As a thought experiment, we might also imagine mechanisms for sepa-
rating constitutional questions from remedial and factual influences that 
might result in skewed lawmaking.  We might, for instance, designate cer-
tain judges to hear the merits of cases presenting constitutional issues and to 
frame constitutional principles that would govern future similar cases.  In 
such cases, we might ask the parties to brief the merits question separately 
from other questions in the case regardless of whether the case would in-
volve qualified immunity determinations (in the civil context) or motions to 
exclude evidence (in the criminal context).  The judge deciding the constitu-
tional question would thus be insulated from the potentially undesirable in-
centives imposed by ancillary remedial considerations.  Only if the 
designated judge found a constitutional violation would the case proceed to 
another judge to determine further issues such as qualified immunity de-
fenses or motions to dismiss criminal charges for lack of evidence. 
In future scholarship I will extend this thought experiment with the 
goal of exploring more thoroughly the conditions necessary for intelligent 
judicial lawmaking.78  Here, my purpose is simply to promote evaluation of 
where constitutional law should be made and to encourage openness to a 
range of venues where clarification of constitutional principles may take 
place. 
CONCLUSION 
The articulation of constitutional rights serves many purposes.  It plac-
es both citizens and government officers on notice of the law governing 
their behavior.  It allows for the incremental evolution of the law in re-
sponse to the development of social norms, advances in technology, and 
shifts in policy prerogatives.  And it allows for the continued refinement of 
doctrine with the benefit of experience. 
But not all law clarification is created equal.  Some circumstances 
present a heightened risk that the law articulated will be poorly reasoned, 
overbroad, or simply wrong.  While actions for money damages provide an 
important opportunity to clarify the law, data suggests that the fact that such 
clarification so often takes place in the context of a qualified immunity de-
termination renders that law susceptible to skewing.  In light of the impor-
tance of law clarification, it may sometimes still be desirable to articulate 
constitutional law in the context of qualified immunity adjudications.  But 
we should bear in mind that other venues do exist and weigh the advantages 
and disadvantages of those other venues in determining where, ultimately, 
courts should make law. 
 
78  See Leong, supra note 67. 
